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INTRODUCTION 
Rocky Mount, North Carolina continues to embrace its motto as “a city on the rise.” In particular, the city 
has sought to redevelop its historic downtown given the decline of businesses and residents over several 
decades. Since Hurricane Floyd devastated many community assets in 1999, the City of Rocky Mount has 
initiated and implemented local public sector investments for the redevelopment of historic properties 
using federal and state resources to incite development. The development of the Douglas Block and 
Streetscape renovations, more recently, have signaled a belief in the potential redevelopment of 
downtown Rocky Mount. However, investment from the public sector, in the long-term, is an 
unsustainable strategy to pursuing economic development for all of the city center. Rather, public 
investment should incite private-sector interest. 
From my previous work in Rocky Mount, it is evident that single-site strategies for market-rate 
development are not feasible in Rocky Mount’s downtown region. When the private-sector has been 
involved, 1-2 parcels are purchased but do not demonstrate a change in the market that would prompt 
additional interest. As a result, an alternative model for provoking real estate development is warranted. 
This Masters Project assesses the viability of redevelopment of select properties in downtown Rocky 
Mount, NC as a catalyst for economic development. The analysis attempts to identify the critical mass, or 
scale of acquisition and operation, needed to make private investment feasible through an acquisition 
fund. Two case studies on the downtown development trends in Durham, NC and Richmond, VA inform 
the redevelopment strategy. Implementation of an acquisition fund will spur the process for 
comprehensively changing the market dynamics, as a “tipping point” for real estate and economic 
development.  
To address this statement, the following report will be separated into three sections that provide the 
context for the strategy, review case studies, and offer recommendations based on an original financial 
model. Part 1 will provide context for the strategy by detailing the background on the project and project 
area; situating the acquisition fund model in literature on downtown redevelopment; and describing the 
current market for development in Rocky Mount. Part 2 will review case studies in peer cities that 
influence the assumptions within the acquisition model.  Part 3 will provide an overview of the financial 
model and provide recommendations on using the acquisition fund as a tool for future development.  
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PART 1: CONTEXT FOR THE ACQUISITION FUND STRATEGY 
PROJECT BACKGROUND 
The City of Rocky Mount is on the cusp of several catalytic investments that can transform the city, 
specifically the downtown corridor.  However, the scale of distressed properties has hampered broader 
reinvestment in the past and requires innovative strategies to reap the potential for redevelopment in the 
future. This report explores how a strategy for site control of several properties can make development 
feasible in distressed areas. 
The project builds on previous work with a property owner in downtown Rocky Mount, located at 218-
224 SW Main Street. I analyzed the financial feasibility of redeveloping the properties as mixed-use units. 
Given the market analysis and estimated development costs, the project did not meet the underwriting and 
equity investment criteria typically required for debt and equity capital. The analysis reaffirmed a 
common trend throughout the downtown—redevelopment of single properties are unlikely to be 
supported by traditional private investment mechanisms. While the City of Rocky Mount has used public 
sector investment for rehabilitation of the Douglas Block
1
, the City is not, nor should be, interested in 
funding the entire downtown redevelopment strategy.  An acquisition fund is an alternative to public 
investment where acquiring a critical mass of properties will create enough operating income to meet the 
criteria for interest from the private-sector through debt and 
equity investments.  
While Rocky Mount’s downtown has seen considerable 
disinvestment in the past decades, the recent years have 
signaled the potential for development. Key projects from 
the public- and private-sector have the potential to support 
the incremental rehabilitation of downtown. From the 
public sector, investments in the downtown streetscape, 
completed in 2013, and redevelopment of the Douglas 
Block, completed in 2011, provide examples of the 
local potential.
2
 In the fall of 2014, the City Council 
                                                          
1
 The Douglas Block is the renovation of the historically African American business district on the edge of Rocky 
Mount’s Main Street. Located in Edgecombe County, the redevelopment of historical buildings and location of local 
business is significant for future development in the predominately African American county.  
2
 Steephen, Anisha. 2013. Downtown Redevelopment-Rocky Mount’s Douglas Block. February 13. Accessed 
September 2014. http://ced.sog.unc.edu/?p=4413. 
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approved development of an event center in downtown.
 3
  The $37 million investment from the City will 
be a 125,000 square foot multipurpose facility that will seat 3,000-5,000 visitors, enjoying events that 
range from basketball tournaments to trade shows.
4
 Simultaneously, the Edgecombe County Community 
College is constructing a Biotechnology and Simulation Center expansion with tax revenue, New Market 
tax credits, and private- and public-sector donations.
5
 From the private-sector, Southern Bank, currently 
located downtown, is expected to construct a new business center two blocks from its current location.
6
 
Additionally, the Rocky Mount Brew Mill project, an incubator for craft brewers, signals the potential for 
a new and likely younger population coming to the City and has the potential to expand to 300,000 square 
feet of interior building space and 30 mill houses.
7
 As a result, redevelopment of Rocky Mount’s 
downtown historical district can build and solidify the development momentum.  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Rocky Mount’s long-term disinvestment warrants a comprehensive redevelopment strategy of downtown, 
providing important context for promoting an acquisition fund as a strategy for economic development. 
This economic development strategy has its roots in understanding the central business district as a hub of 
economic activity for primary and secondary cities.  
Specifically for secondary cities, like Rocky Mount, revitalization of the urban center has been the 
response to decentralization trends. In 2001, Burayidi argues that since the 1920s, the decentralization of 
downtowns has created spatial disconnect between work and home, especially for low-income residents.
8
 
As residents begin to work and live on the urban fringe, and outside of city boundaries, there is a decrease 
                                                          
3
 Handgraaf, Brie. 2014. City moves ahead with event center plans. September 23. Accessed October 2014. 
http://www.rockymounttelegram.com/news/city-moves-ahead-event-center-plans-2660071#comments. 
4
 City of Rocky Mount. 2014. "Frequently Asked Questions: Rocky Mount Event Center & Market/Feasibiilty 
Study." RockyMount.gov. Accessed September 2014. 
http://www.rockymountnc.gov/documents/EventCenterFAQs.pdf. 
5
 Edgecombe Community College. 2012. "Community Would Benefit from New ECC Facility for Health Science 
Education." Edgecombe Community College. September. Accessed October 2014. 
http://www.edgecombe.edu/vote-yes/quarter-cent-sales-tax-article-pigg.pdf. 
Joint Legistlative Committee on Local Government. 2014. "Proposed Local Government Financing." NCLEG. 
August 11. Accessed October 2014. 
http://www.ncleg.net/DocumentSites/Committees/JLCLG/Local%20Government%20Debt%20Submission
s/2014%20Debt%20Submissions/2014LocalGovernmentDebt43.pdf. 
Carson, John. 2014. County board approves biotech lab funds. July 15. Accessed October 2014. 
https://www.rockymounttelegram.com/tarboro/county-board-approves-biotech-lab-funds-2536821. 
6
 Rocky Mount Chamber of Commerce. 2014. Southern Bank to Build New Business Center. March 3. Accessed 
September 2014. http://www.rockymountchamber.org/news/newsarticledisplay.aspx?ArticleID=2604. 
7
 Baverman, Laura. 2014. The Rocky Mount Brewmill: Crafting North Carolina's Future in Beer. July 28. Accessed 
October 2014. http://exitevent.com/article/the-rocky-mount-brewmill-crafting-north-carolinas-future-in-
beer-14729. 
Rocky Mount Brew Mill. 2014. Rocky Mount Brew Mill. Accessed September 2014. http://brewmill.com/ 
8
 Burayidi, Michael. 2001. "Preface." In Downtowns: Revitalizing the Centers of Small Urban Communities, edited 
by Michael Burayidi. Phsychology Press. 
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in tax revenue for public services, loss of agricultural land, and increase in the costs of transportation. 
Redevelopment of city centers seeks to mitigate these factors, returning to a monocentric model of cities 
that improves social interaction and improves societal wellness. This approach is especially poignant as 
the City of Rocky Mount is the economic node of the broader Rocky Mount Metropolitan Statistical 
Area.
9
 
Dagney Faulk offers additional context for understanding the “process and practice of downtown 
revitalization.”10 She describes seven revitalization approaches common in secondary cities: 1) making 
the area more pedestrian friendly; 2) developing indoor shopping centers; 3) preserving historic buildings; 
4) developing along the waterfront; 5) developing office space; 6) pursuing special activity generators 
(i.e. sports complex or convention center); and 7) improving transportation. Rocky Mount has 
implemented many of these strategies in an effort to spur economic development, including streetscape 
redevelopment, construction of indoor shopping centers, historic preservation, and development of the 
Event Center and Imperial Center. Specifically in small cities, Faulk cites the barriers to downtown 
revitalization as: 1) the inability to attract new development; 2) difficulty in attracting people on the 
evenings and weekends; 3) competition from discount stores and malls; 4) clusters of vacant space; and 5) 
parking infrastructure.  
Rocky Mount currently experiences these barriers to development, especially dealing with high vacancy 
rates across the city center. Many of the current properties would fall under Faulk’s term of a “white 
elephant” where large, underutilized or vacant properties are difficult to develop yet define the inherent 
nature of the downtown environment. As a result, Rocky Mount is at Stage 6 of Faulk’s process for 
downtown revitalization. Rocky Mount developed as a commercial and retail center (stage 1), yet 
experienced significant decline in the residential population that surrounded the area (stage 2). 
Subsequently, there was a decline in the retail and commercial space (stage 3) that led to high levels of 
vacancies and underutilized properties (stage 4). To address these trends the local government and non-
profit organizations have advocated and redeveloped significant properties in downtown (Steps 5 and 6) 
as primarily infill developments; but their efforts over the past 20+ years have left the area to 
continuously look for other strategies for development. 
11
 
As a result, an alternative strategy to downtown redevelopment (stage 6) lies in redefining the downtown 
market as a whole, rather than continuing with urban-infill development with the hope that interest will 
                                                          
9
 Brueckner, Jan K.. 2011. Lectures on Urban Economics. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press. Accessed October 31, 
2014. ProQuest ebrary. 
10
 Faulk, Dagney. 2006. "The Process and Practice of Downtown Revitalization." Review of Policy Research 23 (2). 
11
 Ibid. 
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grow and be feasible due to the low cost of land. Redefining the market takes the position that acquiring 
enough land that makes redevelopment profitable at a larger scale creates a new market demand that is 
feasible. McCormack Baron Salazar, a national real estate development company in distressed 
communities, aligns with this view arguing that the conglomeration of distressed neighborhoods requires 
a large-scale development to successfully revitalize the neighborhood.
12
 
To create lasting change, revitalization efforts must achieve Critical Mass – the scale needed for 
a development effort to change people’s perceptions of an area and to cause a shift in the market 
in the area. When this critical mass is reached, a “tipping point” occurs in the market leading to 
additional investment and new development in the community. Smaller stand alone projects that 
exist as islands rarely reach critical mass and therefore cannot create lasting change.  
       (pg. 15) 
From this perspective, assembling a critical mass of properties begins the process for revitalizing a 
distressed neighborhood and building lasting change.  
For example, Galster, Tatian, and Accordiano look to answer the question of using public investment as a 
trigger for revitalization of distressed neighborhoods. The authors use a post-intervention, absolute-
change approach of assessing the target areas of the Richmond Neighborhood Revitalization Strategy, in 
Richmond, Virginia. Among the findings that strong city and community leadership helped realize 
success in the 20-year plan, comes the assertion that a critical mass of public investment resources can 
help spur growth. Additionally, “even more critically, these initiatives were spatially focused so they 
reached a threshold concentration that stimulated private market activity.”13 As a result, the combination 
of public and private investment helped the city reach a critical mass of resources (in land and in capital) 
that spurred continued revitalization.  
Employing the above strategies raises the question: What threshold of resources and land assembly is 
sufficient to create a critical mass, or ‘tipping point,’ that changes the local market? The Brookings 
Institution’s Bruce Katz argues that a critical mass is seen when at least two percent of the metropolitan 
area’s population lives downtown. 14 However, most would argue that there is not a strict model for 
                                                          
12
 McCormack Baron Salazar. 2012. A New Paradigm: Strategies for Revitalizing Dallas' Distressed 
Neighborhoods. Report for The Real Estate Council, St. Louis: McCormack Baron Salazar. 
13
 Galster, George, Peter Tatian, and John Accordiano. 2006. "Targeting Investments for Neighborhood 
Revitilization." Journal of the American Planning Association 72 (4): 457-473. 
14
 Katz, Bruce. 2006. The 2% Solution: Drawing a Critical Mass of Residents Downtown is Key to Urban Revival . 
November 26. Accessed September 2014. 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2006/11/26newyorkstate-katz. 
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development of downtowns. Rather successful downtowns are categorized by varying institutional 
strengths that provide targeted services for the community. 
15
 
Without a specific model for downtown development, the potential for negative externalities and barriers 
to implementation must also be considered. For example, realizing a community’s vision for downtown 
development is often a long-term process, and for some can be seen as a barrier for implementation. 
While implementation can span over several decades, key factors that frame the vision can change, 
including: local leadership, economic feasibility, and the availability of capital. These changes may also 
lead to a shift from the original vision for the area. Additionally, the literature, specifically on downtown 
development, is limited in discussing the negative externalities. As seen in many downtowns, 
development and increased density is not always a community-oriented process. Often early investors and 
the local government must pursue long-term strategies that can mitigate the potential for gentrification. So 
while these barriers and negative externalities exist, the research and financial model presented offer a 
strong approach that acknowledges the potential impact on the process.   
Overall, the literature offers a framework for understanding cities and the benefits and barriers of 
downtown revitalization. Reinforcing these benefits in Rocky Mount requires employing a critical mass 
of resources (financial and physical) to realize large-scale and long-term change. Identifying the level of 
acquisition for a critical mass has yet to be discussed in the literature, demonstrating the need for this 
project as an example of an acquisition model for one community. Finally, understanding the factors 
needed to employ these strategies is an iterative process that will be taken through this report.  
ROCKY MOUNT’S DEVELOPMENT MARKET  
Although Rocky Mount has employed different strategies to incite economic development, there are two 
persistent issues that limit the viability of development on a small-scale.  
1. Limited Market Feasibility. Currently, development of individual properties does not offer a 
profitable return to potential investors.  
2. Scattered Ownership. This becomes a barrier as multi-site development is contingent on a critical 
mass of site control. 
 
                                                          
15
 Ferguson, Gary. 2005. Characteristics of Successful Downtowns: Shared Attributes of Outstanding Small & Mid-
Sized Downtowns. Draft Research for Cornell University Civic Fellows Program, Ithaca Downtown 
Partnership. 
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Limited Market Feasibility 
From my work with different public and private-sector property owners in downtown Rocky Mount, I 
discovered their well-intentioned efforts to redevelop a single property or block of properties has not 
incited long-term development interests from the private-sector.
16
 One tangible example was evident 
through my work with a downtown property owner in the summer of 2014, as cited above. The owner’s 
12,000 square foot property was located in the heart of downtown on SW Main Street, on the same block 
as Citi Trends, a national retailer that saw relatively frequent business in this area. I conducted an 
assessment of the financial feasibility of development by: 
 Analyzing the retail, residential, and short-term housing residential markets; 
 Estimating of the development costs and operating income for a recommended program; 
 Determining the estimated scale of risk-adjusted returns needed to attract private investment; and  
 Evaluating potential financial and structuring options including the use of historic tax credits and 
other funding options.  
In working with the property owner, there was market potential and risks for development, which 
included: 
Market Potential Market Risks 
Several potential developments in 
Downtown Rocky Mount: South Bank 
Building,  Edgecombe Community 
College, Event Center 
Stagnant growth outside of the 
Douglas Block 
Success of the Douglas Block 
residential and some retailers 
Low market rents to support historic 
redevelopment 
City’s infrastructure investment: 
Streetscape 
Proximity to distressed properties 
Proposed Brewery Mill project Limited amenities in immediate area 
                                                          
16
 I was a Graduate City Management Intern with the City of Rocky Mount in the summer of 2013. Additionally, I 
worked with a property owner in the summer of 2014 to provide recommendations on the financial feasibility of 
redevelopment.  
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The potential and the risks framed the analysis of the feasibility of this single site. After researching the 
market for residential, retail, or short-term housing uses it was evident that the potential net 
operating income would not cover the costs of redevelopment. As a result, the market analysis and 
financial model, based on conservative assumptions, demonstrated that redevelopment was not financially 
feasible. The required returns to finance the project could not be met by the market. Specifically, the 
model showed a 3 percent internal rate of return,
17
 where the benchmark is typically 15-20 percent. Also 
when assessing the equity multiple,
18
 the project only saw a 20 percent increase on the equity investment 
(or 1.2x equity multiple), where the benchmark is typically 1.8x -2.0x. 
From this analysis, it was evident why development of a single site was not a strong financial investment 
in the past. The potential income generated by the property, would not cover the costs of development. In 
fact, to make the project feasible and redevelopment a profitable investment, the rental rates would 
need to increase by more than double.
19
 Given the demographics and location of development, charging 
2-3 times the market-rent, especially on a single-site, would be unrealistic on a small property adjacent to 
other distressed properties.  
My research was also substantiated by a CoStar report 
on recent sales and availability of commercial 
properties across the City of Rocky Mount. While the 
CoStar report only looks at a segment of the real estate 
described in this project, it is important to note this data 
that is nationally available on the real estate market in 
Rocky Mount.  From Chart 1, the asking rent per 
square foot declined dramatically during the Great 
Recession, but has leveled off from its peak in 2012 and 2013. As a result, the five-year average rent per 
square foot is $6.22, well below the $10-$13 rent per square foot for some commercial (office and retail) 
properties in downtown Rocky Mount. Additionally, the five-year average of available property is 
950,000 square feet, signaling there is an oversupply of available properties and potentially minimal 
demand for new construction.  
While CoStar’s report demonstrates select trends for the entire Rocky Mount market, it also highlights 
how the data can impact an outsider’s perspective on the profitability of investment. Therefore, it is 
                                                          
17
 The internal rate of return measures the profitability of an investment.  
18
 The equity multiple is the ratio of cash flow to equity invested in the projects, measuring how the equity 
investment is leveraged. 
19
 I used a sensitivity analysis to see how increases in the residential price per square foot would affect the IRR of 
the project.  
Chart 1. CoStar Data for the City of Rocky Mount 
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Howard Street 
necessary to create a market to improve the feasibility and provide a “tipping point” for local and 
regional private-sector investors to take interest.  
Scattered Ownership 
Creating a “tipping point” for development is contingent on acquiring a critical mass of property for site 
control. The process of acquisition is time consuming and can be costly, when looking to acquire a 
significant portion of the area that would 1) make redevelopment financially feasible and 2) signal a new 
market for development.  A barrier to achieving critical mass is the scattered ownership across downtown, 
specifically for small parcels.  For example, I looked at two key sites for the downtown area, identified by 
the City of Rocky Mount Downtown Coordinator – Howard Street and Five Points. On Howard Street, to 
acquire only 77,284 square feet of property one would have to coordinate with 18 different owners. 
Similarly, in Five Points acquiring only 49,000 square feet of property would require coordination with 
10 different owners.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This trend represents ownership across downtown Rocky Mount and presents a major barrier in acquiring 
critical mass. The returns to investors in the acquisition fund will be impacted by a longer acquisition 
period to obtain a significant number of built square feet.  
 
Five Points 
 10 different owners 
 17 parcels 
 $783K tax assessed value 
 49K sq. ft. 
 1.13 acres 
 18 Different Owners 
 20 parcels 
 $1.5M tax assessed value 
 77,284 sq. ft.  
 1.77 acres 
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PART 2: COMPARISON CASE STUDIES 
A number of cities join the City of Rocky Mount in their quest to return to the prominent days of its city 
center. Acknowledging this economic development goal across many south eastern cities, I looked at two 
case studies where portions of downtown had a significant number of distressed properties, yet 
experienced redevelopment due to anchor private-sector investments. Durham, NC and Richmond, VA, 
two southern cities, both experienced growth due to the tobacco and manufacturing industries.  Both 
communities offer the perspective of how downtowns that thrived on their industrial base have been 
redeveloping in response to the desire for urban living and due to investments from both the private- and 
public-sectors.  
These case studies will serve as examples of downtown revitalization, while also providing benchmarks 
for assumptions in the acquisition fund model. An overview of development in these areas will address 
the context of development, discuss one of several primary (private-sector) stakeholders in development, 
and assess tax record parcel data regarding the increase in property value over time.  
METHODOLOGY 
The case studies rely on both qualitative and quantitative methodologies to provide benchmarks for the 
Rocky Mount acquisition strategy. For both case studies I used recent news articles, local downtown 
development plans, and interviews with key stakeholders to provide background and context on the 
acquisition and redevelopment process. I used ArcGIS to outline the study area, then reviewed property 
tax data in ArcGIS and excel from the local government to provide context on the value and recent sale of 
properties.  
For the Durham case study, I was able to benchmark trends on the sale price per square foot from my 
interviews with a primary development partner. I analyzed the tax assessed value per square foot of the 
built square foot and applied a benchmark of $40 (based on information from interviews) to assess the 
change in distressed properties. Additionally, I relied on the tax data to summarize the trends in the tax 
assessed value and vacancy.  For the Richmond case study, I analyzed the data on recent sales within the 
project area in terms of frequency and the average price per square foot. Trends in land prices were 
analyzed based on the real estate cycle from 1989-2006.
 20
 Noting the timing of the sale in the real estate 
cycle accounts for the valuation of land nationally and the availability of capital to purchase. Purchasing 
land after a peak in the real estate cycle often signals an opportunity to acquire land at a lower price.   
                                                          
20
 Hanke, Steve. 2014. The Great 18-Year Real Estate Cycle. April. 
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/great-18year-real-estate-cycle. 
 12 
 
DURHAM, NC 
Durham, North Carolina is one of three anchor downtown communities in the Research Triangle Region. 
However, strong growth in the region did not initially equate to a resurgence of downtown. Specifically, 
before the 2000s, the majority of downtown’s estimated 5 million square feet was distressed.21 At that 
time, minimal public and private investments signaled a disinterest in the downtown area, meaning it soon 
became an area that was perceived as ‘unsafe’. However, over the next decade Durham saw nearly $1 
billion in public and private investments. According to the 2008 update of the Downtown Durham Master 
Plan, between 2000 and 2007 there were over $775 million in private-sector investments. Projects like the 
American Tobacco Campus by Raleigh-based Capital Broadcasting Company, West Village mixed-use 
developments, and several projects lead by the Greenfire Development represented significant private-
sector investments and became anchors for future development from smaller developers in the future.
22
  
Further information on downtown Durham’s investments was offered in interviews with Michael 
Lemanski, a partner with Greenfire Development.
23
 As cited in the Downtown Durham Master Plan, 
Greenfire Development was one of several private-sector developers that acquired a significant area of 
downtown Durham (roughly 900,000 built square feet) over a four-year period. Purchasing the properties 
at an estimated $40 per square foot, the development company was able to sell several properties for $100 
per square foot over a six-year period. As a result, Greenfire’s acquisition of nearly 20 percent of 
downtown Durham saw an estimated 250% price mark-up over the hold-period. The company’s long-
term investment in downtown Durham provided an unlevered internal rate of return of ~20 percent and a 
levered return of ~28 percent. As a result, the company’s financial and development investment in the 
Downtown area helped to signify a turning point in the downtown market.  
These trends are substantiated by analysis of property tax data from Durham County.
24
 From 2001 to 
2010, the percentage of distressed buildings, using a benchmark of $40 per square foot, declined by 
nearly 30 percent. Additionally, underutilized or vacant parcels declined by 5 percent. Overall 
development across downtown increased the aggregate tax assessed value by 220%. From these data 
points, it is evident that Durham experienced significant development over the decade, prompting an 
increase in downtown’s property values.  
                                                          
21
 UNC School of Government Development Finance Initiative. 2014. "Redevelopment of Downtown Durham." 
22
 Development Concepts, Inc. 2008. Downtown Durham Master Plan: Seven Year Review & Updated Work Plan. 
Master Plan, Downtown Durham, Inc. 
23
  Lemanski, Micheal, interview by Maggie Parker. 2015. 
24
 Durham County. 2001. "Property Tax Records." GIS Data.; Durham County. 2010. "Property Tax Record." GIS 
Data. 
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RICHMOND, VA 
The City of Richmond has a long history as an industrial anchor for the southern states, especially as the 
capital city of Virginia. However, like in many cities the real estate market has fluctuated in the 
downtown core. In this case, shifts in the transportation for industrial products and the decline of 
manufacturing had a major impact. For Richmond, one area named Shockoe Bottom experienced this 
decline as a former industrial core along the James River and adjacent to the various railroad lines. 
Shockoe Bottom is east of downtown’s central business district, nestled between Interstate 95.  In an 
effort to learn more about Richmond’s downtown development Jack Betty, Executive Director of Venture 
Richmond, argued that the visionary for redevelopment in this area was William H. Abeloff.  He “got out 
far in front of the market and took a big risk to create a residential market [in] Tobacco Row … in the 
mid-90s.”25 My analysis on the Tobacco Row investment, in the context of the Shockoe Bottom area, 
provides insight into the how private-sector investments can build confidence in the real estate market of 
a distressed area.  
According the City of Richmond’s tax records, William Abeloff purchased Tobacco Row in 1981 with 
plans to convert the empty tobacco warehouses into a mixed-use development.  Abeloff’s acquisition 
proved to be significant, as it represented ~17% of the privately built square feet in the Shockoe Bottom.
26
 
After several years of holding the properties and unsuccessful attempts for redevelopment of the project, 
he sold the properties to Forest City, a national developer that specializes in public-private partnerships in 
urban areas.
27
 Once Forest City acquired the properties in 1989, Tobacco Row opened in 1991 as “a 
thriving mixed-use, residential district with five multifamily residential buildings with a total of 730 units; 
[and] one, 137,000-square-foot office building.”28 
Redevelopment of Tobacco Row has been called the anchor for development of Shockoe Bottom. 
Analysis of the trends in property values demonstrates the impact of acquiring a ‘critical mass’ of 
properties to build confidence in the local market. The analysis reviews the change in property valuation 
from the City of Richmond’s property tax data, and also accounts for an understanding of the real estate 
market during the time of acquisition. Forest City purchased the property at the peak of the real estate 
cycle, yet also during a decline in recent sales in the Shockoe Bottom. (Appendix, Table 1) As a result, it 
is likely that the property value for Tobacco Row was at the lower end of the spectrum because there 
                                                          
25
 Betty, Jack, interview by Maggie Parker. 2015. Venture Richmond (February). 
26
 City of Richmond. 2015. "Historic Property Tax Data." GIS Data. 
27
 Abeloff eventually went into another deal named Rockett’s Landing, which was anticipated to be a $250M 
waterfront investment in 2004.   
Johnson, Gregory J. and Nicole Gilligan. 2004. "Developers' big plans rolling on the river." Richmond Times-
Dispatch. July 30. Accessed April. http://www.kampkewanee.org/articles/abeloff/. 
28
 Forest City Enterprises. 2015. Tobacco Row. Accessed March 2015. 
http://www.forestcity.net/properties/mixed_use/property_listing/Pages/tobacco_row.aspx. 
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would be less demand to acquire properties during this time. In that year, 1989, the average sale price per 
square foot was $44. (Appendix, Table 2) Given the timing of their purchase and renovation in 1991, we 
see the most significant increase in property values into the peak of the next real estate cycle in 2006.
29
 
Chart 2 shows an increase in property values at their highest levels before the Great Recession. The 
average sales per square foot increased by nearly 700% from 2002 to 2005.  
Chart 2. Shockhoe Bottom Sales Price per Square Foot Trends 
 
These trends signal a greater interest and valuation, particularly in the years after redevelopment of an 
anchor property, Tobacco Row. As a result, Abelhoff’s vision for the area and Forest City’s later 
redevelopment of the property signaled confidence in the downtown neighborhood.  
KEY FINDINGS 
From the analysis of downtown development in both Durham, NC and Richmond VA we see how 
acquiring a ‘critical mass’ of properties equated to purchasing 17-20% of the built square feet in the 
project area. The key acquisitions by Greenfire Development and William Abelhoff /Forest City signaled 
confidence in the real estate market, as the developers took the role of visionaries within downtown.  Not 
only did these initial investors acquire land, likely at a low cost, but their acquisition strategies also set the 
context for future development. By setting this context, they were able to see significant returns estimated 
to be 2.5 to 7 times their original investment. 
 
                                                          
29
 Additionally, during this real estate cycle Shockoe Bottoms experiences the most aggregate sales in comparison to 
other time periods. In fact, most of those sales were adjacent to other recently sold properties, signaling a shift of 
interest in the Shockoe Bottom market. (Appendix, Map 1)  
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PART 3: MODELING THE ACQUISITION FUND 
In order for Rocky Mount to realize similar development as Durham, NC and Richmond, VA, acquiring a 
critical mass of properties through an acquisition fund is a strong strategy to catalyze a “tipping point” in 
downtown. The final section provides an overview of the acquisition model and the overall assumptions 
that affect the model. 
Please see Appendix 2 for the acquisition timeline, cash flow assumptions, and cash flow model that 
demonstrate the financial feasibility of acquiring nearly 20 percent of the built square feet in the project 
area. The model assumes that over a 10-year period, overlapping four years for acquisition and 
eight years for disposition, investors will see an estimated before-tax internal rate of return of ~25 
percent. As a result, there is potential for a profitable investment to provide a catalyst for development in 
downtown. 
Several assumptions in the financial model account for the potential of a financially profitable acquisition 
fund. The remainder of this section will address the primary assumptions in the acquisition timeline and 
the pro forma model.  These assumptions affect the opportunity and the risk for development. 
 Key Assumptions for the Acquisition Timeline 
o Project Area to Acquire: 1.8M privately-owned built square feet 
o Percentage of Square Feet to Acquire: 18-20% 
o Timeline for Acquisition: 4 years 
o Estimated Price of Acquisition: $10 per square foot 
o Estimated Cost of Stabilization: 20% of the acquisition price 
o Estimated Increase in Property Values at Disposition: $20 - $50 per square foot 
 Key Assumptions for the Pro Forma Model 
o Estimated Debt Leveraged: 40% of the fund’s value 
o Additional Revenue 
o Estimated Operating Expenses 
KEY ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE ACQUISITION TIMELINE 
Project Area for Acquisition 
The acquisition fund will target Rocky Mount’s Main Street and adjacent streets within both Nash and 
Edgecombe counties, as seen in Map 1. The total project area accounts for 188 properties within 72 
acres of downtown.  Additionally, 66 percent of the 2.7 million built square feet is privately 
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owned.
30
 These streets encompass the core of 
downtown, where individual property owners and 
tenants have demonstrated an interest in redevelopment, 
but where effort has been scattered. Selection of this 
project area accounts for the ongoing public sector 
investments, including the Event Center and the 
streetscape improvements, location of parcels within the 
Local and National Historic Districts, and an 
understanding of the area as the center of Downtown 
Rocky Mount. Using the historic districts as a boundary 
for the project area accounts for the potential to use 
federal historic tax credits on properties within those 
districts. North Carolina’s state historic tax credits are 
currently being reevaluated by the General Assembly, 
with the potential to revamp the once dismantled 
program.
31
 
Percentage of Square Feet to Acquire 
The fund assumes that about ~18-20% of the targeted 
project area would be acquired, as the estimated 
critical mass of properties. This target accounts for 
between 325,000 - 375,000 square feet, where the 
number of properties to acquire can range from 35-45 depending on the size of the properties. The target 
of 20% derives from our case studies in Durham, NC (~20%) and Richmond, VA, (~17%) where key 
acquisitions and development of properties signaled strong confidence in the real estate market.  Although 
the case studies in this report substantiate this estimate, other factors like the assumed access to capital, 
timeline for acquisition, and assumed growth in price per square foot were additional benchmarks 
throughout the financial model.  
                                                          
30
 The analysis of the project area used only the privately-owned built square feet, where properties that were either 
vacant or publicly-owned were removed from the calculation of potential properties to acquire.  
31
 Woolverton, Paul. 2015. House to vote Historic Property Tax Credit bill on Wednesday, could help Prince 
Charles Hotel. March 24. Accessed 2015 March . 
http://www.fayobserver.com/blogs/news/peoples_business/house-committee-passes-historic-property-tax-
credit-bill-could-help/article_3cfaf9d0-d22c-11e4-bf1d-033084becaef.html. 
 
Legend
CentralCityNationalHD
CentralCityLocalHD
Acquisitions_Edgecomb
Acquisitions_Nash
Map 1. Acquisition Project Area 
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It is important to note that other acquisition strategies discussed in this research have acquired roughly 10-
30 properties during the same time period, or less. Unlike in the case studies described above, the median 
built square feet in Edgecombe County is 28,000 and in Nash County is 41,000. As a result, a significant 
number of properties must be acquired to reach a critical mass, which in this case is defined as 20% of the 
privately owned built square feet. 
Timeline for Acquisition 
The model assumes that properties will be acquired over a four-year period, within the 10-year duration 
of the fund. This timeline must account for the scattered ownership across the project area, where 
ownership of only 20,000 – 30,000 square feet requires a thorough and lengthy process of due diligence 
to close on the property. This will prove to be a lengthy process, and will also increase the anticipated 
value of the property from the owners. The model accounts for this increase in valuation (by the property 
owner) through an assumption of a 5 percent annual increase in both Nash and Edgecombe counties.  
Estimated Price of Acquisition 
Properties are estimated to be acquired at $10 per square foot, with an anticipated 5 percent increase in 
valuation as noted above. The estimation is derived from property tax data from the City of Rocky Mount, 
Nash County, and Edgecombe County to determine the current tax assessed value and recent sales. In the 
project area located in Edgecombe County, the average tax assessed value per square foot was $11.63 
where recent sales averaged $7.77 per square foot. In Nash County, the average tax assessed value was 
$12.07 per square foot, and recent sales averaged $13.41 per square foot. Using $10 accounts for these 
trends in recent trends and tax assessed value, while also acknowledging that the specific properties to be 
acquired within the project area are currently unknown. 
Estimated Cost to Stabilize Properties 
The cost of acquiring properties is also based on the need to stabilize properties to be able to sell in the 
future. After meeting with leadership of Rocky Mount’s Downtown Renaissance Inc., the analysis 
assumes that 20% of the original cost to acquire must also be accounted for in addition to the acquisition 
price. These funds will pay for capital expenses like new roofs or structural upgrades to manage the 
buildings in the short-term.  
Estimated Increase in Property Values at Disposition 
During the eight years of disposition, the value of the properties are estimated to grow between 2-5 times. 
The estimated sale prices increase $5 annually, while also increasing in the percentage of square feet that 
is sold over the eight-year period, as demonstrated in the timeline below.  
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Growth in the sale price of properties in both Durham (250%) and Richmond (700%) substantiate the 
estimated 500% price mark-up. Additionally, when looking at similarly sized downtowns in North 
Carolina recent sales demonstrate key benchmarks for sales of distressed properties in Rocky Mount. For 
example, less than 20 miles from Rocky Mount, in Wilson, NC the community of about 49,600 has 
roughly 3.3 million built square feet in downtown. According to the property tax research, recent sales in 
their downtown average $25 per square foot.
32
 Additionally, in Burlington, NC there at about 51,500 
residents with a smaller downtown of about 1.5 million built square feet. In an interview with the 
Downtown Burlington Corporation, the recent sales of distressed buildings have averaged $35 per square 
foot.
33
 In fact, a property in bad condition sold for $13 per square foot, a property in good condition but 
empty sold for $24 per square foot, and a two-story property with only one floor renovated sold for $63 
per square foot.  
In comparison, Rocky Mount has a population of ~ 57,000 with a downtown of over 2.7 million square 
feet (which only accounts for the project area). Similarly, to Burlington and Wilson, these communities 
are on the edge of the Research Triangle region, where a high-growth in jobs and population have 
signaled strong demand for the growth of downtown. Rather, Wilson and Burlington signal an interest the 
resurgence of small-town downtowns where the value per square foot sets a benchmark for the potential 
for an increase in property values, and increased demand, in downtown Rocky Mount.  
Sensitivity Analysis 
As discussed, the key assumptions impact the feasibility of seeing ~25 percent investment returns. The 
following analysis demonstrates the sensitivity of these assumptions on the overall financial feasibility of 
the acquisition fund.  
                                                          
32
 School of Government’s Development Finance Initiative; City of Wilson, NC. 2014. "Property Tax Data." GIS 
Data. 
33
 Morris, Anne, interview by Maggie Parker. 2015. Downtown Burlington Corporation (March 24). 
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Percentage of Square Feet to Acquire 
As the fund acquires more property, or a higher percentage of the built 
square feet, there is the potential for higher returns. Simultaneously, if 
the fund acquires less built square feet, there is still potential for a 16 
percent return on investment.  
 
 
 
 
Estimated Increase in Property Values at Disposition 
Financial returns are also contingent on the growth in the price per 
square foot over the 8 years of disposition, which is currently estimated 
at $50 per square foot in the final two years of disposition. If the 
properties are not able to sell at the estimate property value, then the 
expected returns decline.  
 
 
 
KEY ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE PRO FORMA MODEL 
Estimated Debt Leveraged 
It is estimated that the fund can leverage 40 percent of the total equity raised, $3 million. This assumption 
accounts for the high risk of the project, which may discourage traditional lenders. In market-rate deals, it 
is common to see a 65-75% loan to value ratio for the debt that can be leveraged on the equity in the 
project.  
Estimated Additional Revenue 
As properties are acquired, it is likely that a percentage of those properties will be rented for commercial 
uses. The model accounts for this potential for additional revenue, where 10% of the properties are leased 
at $8 per square foot. This additional revenue increases the overall operating income available to 
investors.  
SF to 
Acquire 
IRR 
 235,000  16% 
 265,000  19% 
295000 22% 
 325,000  24% 
 355,000  26% 
 385,000  30% 
 415,000  35% 
Growth in 
Price per SF 
IRR 
$ 50.00 24.0% 
$ 45.00 23.0% 
$ 40.00 22.0% 
$ 35.00 20.0% 
$ 30.00 17.0% 
$ 25.00 14.0% 
$ 20.00 8.0% 
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Estimated Operating Expenses 
At this stage in estimating the overall costs to manage the fund, the model accounts for maintenance 
expenses, fund management, and the cost of property taxes. Maintenance expenses would total $340,000 
over the ten-year period to cover expenses like utilities and minor repairs, increasing as more properties 
are acquired. Management of the fund includes a $65,000 annual salary to pay for one full-time employee 
to oversee acquisition, disposition, and overall asset management. Finally, the estimated property taxes 
use an average of the rates from Nash and Edgecombe counties, also accounting for an increase in the 
total taxes owed as more properties are purchased.   
Sensitivity Analysis 
Estimated Additional Revenue 
The estimated percentage of properties acquired with additional 
revenues has an impact on the overall returns to investors, signaling an 
interest for the fund manager to consider properties that can increase 
returns.  
 
 
KEY FINDINGS 
An overview of the key assumptions of the model allows for a strong critique of the feasibility of the 
acquisition fund strategy. Additionally, acknowledging the sensitivities within the model allow for 
potential investors to assess their risk in the investment.  
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MODEL 
Implementation of the acquisition fund strategy is contingent on selling the validity of the assumptions to 
key stakeholders in Rocky Mount. To date, I have coordinated two meetings with the President and 
Treasurer of Rocky Mount’s non-profit downtown interest group, Downtown Renaissance Inc.  During 
this time we reviewed the case studies and acquisition model, but also discussed the reality of the 
acquisition fund as a long-term strategy. Primarily we discussed the additional risks that can be associated 
with any development, which may include: the timing of the market, surrounding development trends, 
and the timing of future real estate development. These risks can be significant, but are always unknown 
in long-term strategies. Additionally, we strategized on options for land owners to participate, particularly 
discussing how property owners can put their property as equity into the deal. Given these considerations, 
% of SF with  
Additional Revenue 
IRR 
13% 25.9% 
12% 25.0% 
11% 24.3% 
10% 24.0% 
9% 23.7% 
8% 23.0% 
7% 22.1% 
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our conversations continue to look towards next steps of implementing the acquisition strategy. Our next 
steps are to continue conversations with a select group of potential investors. 
As the community leadership looks towards implementation of the model, it is also important to consider 
the target areas for acquisition. While acquisition is an iterative process, properties that serve as gateways 
to downtown or are currently aligned with public sector investments. For example, both the Howard 
Street corridor and Five Point areas have spurred ideas for an artist-in-residency program and may align 
with an effort for a greenway connecting downtown to residential neighborhoods.  
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CONCLUSION 
Development and justification of the acquisition fund demonstrates the opportunity for Rocky Mount to 
use a redevelopment strategy that supports private-sector interest and involvement. Analysis of 
redevelopment in downtown Durham, NC and in Shockoe Bottom in Richmond, VA reveals concrete 
findings on estimating the required critical mass of properties for redevelopment. If community leaders 
continue to pursue this strategy, there is an opportunity to build confidence in the downtown real estate 
market. Through the process of acquiring and managing properties that inform an overall vision and 
master plan that spurs redevelopment as the “tipping point” for downtown Rocky Mount. 
These findings not only have a local implication, but further inform how secondary cities can apply this 
strategy within their economic development toolbox. Faulk discusses many strategies led by the local 
government or non-profit organizations, but this research suggests that downtown development may also 
employ strategies that cater to private-sector investment interests.  As other downtowns look to redevelop, 
this work has defined a ‘tipping point’ that can be used to benchmark further economic development 
strategies.  
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Chart 1. Sales per Year in Shockoe Bottom, Richmond, VA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 2. Average Sales Price per Square Foot in Shockoe Bottom, Richmond, VA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 24 
 
Map 1. Spatial Analysis of Year of Sale in Shockoe Bottom, Richmond, VA 
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APPENDIX 2 
ACQUISITIONS TIMELINE 
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CASH FLOW ASSUMPTIONS 
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ACQUISITION FUND PRO FORMA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
